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Abstract Biological activities that sequester carbon create CO2 offset credits that
could obviate the need for reductions in fossil fuel use. Credits are earned by storing
carbon in terrestrial ecosystems and wood products, although CO2 emissions are
also mitigated by delaying deforestation, which accounts for one-quarter of anthro-
pogenic CO2 emissions. However, non-permanent carbon offsets from biological
activities are difficult to compare with each other and with emissions reduction
because they differ in how long they prevent CO2 from entering the atmosphere. This
is the duration problem. It results in uncertainty and makes it hard to determine the
legitimacy of biological activities in mitigating climate change. Measuring, verifying
and monitoring the carbon sequestered in sinks greatly increases transaction costs
and leads to rent seeking by sellers of dubious sink credits. While biological sink
activities undoubtedly help mitigate climate change and should not be neglected,
it is shown that there are limits to the substitutability between temporary offset
credits from these activities and emissions reduction, and that this has implications
for carbon trading. A possible solution to inherent incommensurability between
temporary and permanent credits is also suggested.
1 Introduction
Policy makers at all levels are seriously considering the potential role of terrestrial
ecosystems and geological reservoirs for storing carbon, thereby creating CO2 offsets
that could obviate the need for lifestyle-changing reductions in fossil fuel use. Some
scientists claim that, by converting marginal croplands to permanent grasslands or
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forests, the accompanying increase in biomass and soil organic carbon can offset
20% or more of global fossil fuel emissions (Sathaye et al. 2001; Lal 2004a, b). The
Government of Canada (2002) had planned to rely on tree planting and improved
forest management for meeting some one-third of its Kyoto commitment, but
subsequent losses of large swaths of timber to Mountain Pine Beetle and wildfire
greatly reduced the expected role of forests. Proponents of CO2 capture and storage
in deep underground aquifers and abandoned oil/gas fields indicate that there is
enough available storage to trap decades of CO2 emissions (Parson and Keith 1998).
The costs of this option are unknown as there is a risk of sudden future release of
deadly concentrations of CO2—a cost to be evaluated by the willingness of people
to pay to avoid such a risk and not unlike that associated with long-term storage of
nuclear waste, which could be substantial (see Riddel and Shaw 2003).
There is no lack of schemes to generate carbon credits through terrestrial ac-
tivities. Even a cursory investigation finds there are many ‘sellers’ of carbon offset
credits. Examples include:
• Greenfleet (http://www.greenfleet.com.au/greenfleet/objectives.asp, viewed 17
Sep 2008). “For $51 (tax deductible), Greenfleet will plant 17 native trees
[that]. . . will help to create a forest, and as they grow will absorb the greenhouse
gases generated by driving your car for one year”. This project is designed to
increase planting of native species in Australia, with the sale of CO2 offset credits
helping to pay for tree planting. Although there is insufficient information about
the timing of carbon uptake and release to determine the true cost, data provided
by Greenfleet suggest that costs are about US$12.82/tCO2.
• Trees for Life (http://www.treesforlife.org.uk/tfl.global_warming.html, viewed
17 Sep 2008). This conservation charity is dedicated to the regeneration and
restoration of the Caledonian Forest in the Highlands of Scotland. It invites
individuals and organizations to become ‘carbon conscious’ and uses the idea of
a carbon footprint to solicit donations from individuals of £60 ($120), £140 ($280)
and £280 ($360) depending on whether one’s ‘carbon footprint’ is rated as light,
medium or heavy (a guide is provided). Organizations are asked to contribute
much more. For each £5 ($10) donation, Trees for Life claims to plant one tree.
No other details are available.
• Haida-Gwaii Climate Forest Pilot Project (http://www.haidaclimate.com/,
viewed 17 Sep 2008). The Haida-Gwaii First Nation on the Queen Charlotte
Islands off the northern coast of British Columbia intends to restore some 5,000
to 10,000 ha of degraded riparian habitat. It hopes to fund the entire project by
selling carbon credits, although alder that is “growing in an un-natural manner”
would first need to be removed. The preferred mixed-conifer climax rainforest
will eventually sequester 1928–2454 tCO2/ha. Little in the way of cost data
is provided and there is no indication about the timing of carbon uptake or
potential future release, or loss of carbon from removing alder.
Given that the Haida Gwaii are committed to restoring ancient forests because they
are part of their cultural heritage, and that Trees for Life is committed to restoring
the Caledonian Forest, the sale of carbon credits is part of a marketing technique to
solicit funds for a project that may or may not have proceeded in any event.
Some of the now many biological sink projects available to would-be purchasers
of emission offsets provide clear carbon uptake benefits but others are more dubious
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in nature. In some cases, projects are promoted because it happens to be convenient
at the time. For example, a native group in northern Alberta sought tradable carbon
permits for delaying timber harvests, a delay caused by low prices associated with
a decline in lumber demand; the request was subsequently turned down by the
Canadian government.1 In other cases, such as that of a community group in Powell
River, British Columbia, sale of carbon credits is necessary to help fund activities to
prevent the harvest of coastal rainforest. The latter constitutes a forest conservation
activity that generates real carbon-uptake services, although one might want to
consider whether the site could not generate even more carbon-uptake services
if it were harvested and replanted (as required by law). Likewise, tree planting
projects that would proceed at a slower pace without carbon payments, such as those
mentioned above, might well generate legitimate carbon offset credits.
Unfortunately, not only is it difficult to determine whether a carbon sequestration
project is additional, but many other aspects of a carbon sequestration project are
unknown and perhaps unknowable. Even when projects are declared legitimate by
a certifying authority, information about the amount and timing of carbon uptake,
release due to harvests or unexpected denudation by wildfire, pests or disease,
and other aspects of the project is often lacking. For many CDM-initiated forestry
activities that seek to create carbon credits, for example, projects fail to identify all
of the carbon sequestration costs, the future path of carbon uptake and harvests,
the risks of forest denudation, and so forth. Yet, many such projects are simply
funded by international agencies, or ‘picked up’ by companies seeking to improve
their corporate image.
In a review of terrestrial carbon sequestration, the FAO (2004) examined 49
projects that were underway or proposed to create offset credits. Forty-three were
in developing countries and eligible for CDM credits—38 were forestry projects,
of which 17 involved forest conservation. While all projects had local or offshore
sponsors and/or investors (a country and/or company), only 33 of the 49 projects
managed to provide some information on the amount of carbon to be sequestered.
Data on the amount of carbon sequestered could be considered ‘good’ for only 24
projects, although none provided an indication of the timing of carbon benefits.
Information on costs was provided for only 11 projects.
Unlike emissions reduction, biological sink activities are not transparent regarding
CO2 flux. To determine how much CO2 biological sink projects actually remove
from the atmosphere, which is likely necessary to facilitate seamless trading between
carbon sink and emissions reduction offset credits, requires high transaction costs
related to measurement, monitoring and accounting of CO2 flux. Given that these
high transaction costs militate against sinks, there is potential for rent seeking via
dubious carbon sink projects.
The main argument for including biological sink activities in a strategy for mitigat-
ing climate change is that they enable society to lower atmospheric CO2 now while
buying time to develop and implement new technologies for reducing future CO2
emissions. Thus, the economic benefit of biological carbon sinks relates as much to
their value as a ‘bridge’ to the future as it does to their value in reducing atmospheric
1The groups mentioned here approached the author for advice on obtaining carbon credits.
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CO2. In that case, the future release of stored carbon (say, in 30 years) and the timing
of carbon uptake are less of a concern. The objective in this paper is to examine this
issue more closely, to consider whether sinks fulfill this role.
The problem is that emissions reduction and carbon sequestration, while opposite
sides of the same coin in some sense, are not directly comparable, thereby inhib-
iting their trade in carbon markets. The difficulty centers on the length of time
that mitigation strategies withhold CO2 from entering the atmosphere—the dura-
tion problem. In this regard, carbon offset credits from agricultural activities are
particularly ephemeral, while CO2 capture and storage might almost be considered
permanent; forestry activities, on the other hand, lead to carbon sinks that have a
more intermediary duration. The IPCC (2000) recognizes that the carbon embodied
in forests, and especially agricultural ecosystems (grass and soils), is always at risk of
accidental or deliberate release, but that avoided emissions are permanent, despite
the fact that ‘saved’ fossil fuels might release stored CO2 at some future date (Herzog
et al. 2003).2
In the remainder of this paper we investigate the role of duration in greater detail.
This is done by expanding in comprehensive fashion on earlier work by Marland
et al. (2001), Sedjo and Marland (2003), and Herzog et al. (2003). In particular,
we compare carbon mitigation activities according to how long they are able to
lower CO2 levels in the atmosphere. This is important because storage times differ
even among terrestrial activities, with some being more permanent than others. In
the formal analysis, we assume that every temporary credit must be demonstrably
additional and explicitly measured, verified, monitored, recorded and tracked if it is
to be directly comparable with a permanent one. This assumption is relaxed in the
discussion, where we consider how and under what conditions temporary sinks might
yet be used as a bridge to the future given they cannot substitute in straightforward
manner for emissions reduction in carbon trading.
In the next section, we review the role of terrestrial carbon sinks for mitigating
climate change. We then investigate the implications of non-permanence of biolog-
ical sinks in a formal fashion to determine whether the stop-gap nature of forestry
activities makes it difficult for producers and buyers of temporary carbon offsets to
value them, thereby adding to transaction costs and inhibiting trades. This is not
the same as asking whether forestry activities can make a reasonable and useful
contribution to a country’s overall mitigation strategy, although it does shed light on
this issue. The formal analysis is followed by a discussion of its policy implications and
a possible approach to resolving the problem of duration. The conclusions follow.
2 Duration: non-permanence of greenhouse gas mitigation
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities remove carbon from
the atmosphere and store it in biomass, and, under Kyoto, are eligible activities
for creating carbon offset credits. Tree planting and activities that enhance tree
2As one reviewer pointed out, reducing fossil fuel emissions in countries that are party to the Kyoto
Protocol, for example, will result more intensive use of fossil fuels in non-participating countries.
This is a problem of leakage that, while important, is not the same as that of duration.
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growth are among the most important, although tree plantations release a substantial
amount of their stored carbon once harvested, which could happen as soon as five
years after establishment for some fast-growing species. Sequestered carbon might
also be released as a result of wildfire, disease or pests (e.g., mountain pine beetle
infestation in British Columbia).
Based on a meta-regression analysis of 68 studies, van Kooten and Sohngen (2007)
estimated the potential marginal costs of creating carbon offset credits via different
forestry activities. These are provided in Table 1. In many of the studies included in
the analysis, and particularly for a large number of studies not included in the analysis
because of lack of information, the actual number of offset credits (as opposed to
total carbon) that could be counted as part of the project was not available. Less
than 10% of studies provided information on the length of time that carbon was
retained in sinks, although they did provide information on costs per unit of carbon
sequestered. None explicitly included transaction costs.
Given that utility companies are banking on carbon credits costing no more than
$20 per metric ton of CO2 (see The Economist 2007), many forest activities would
not be competitive with emissions reduction, according to Table 1, because the
opportunity cost of land is generally too high. This holds even when account is taken
of carbon stored in wood products. Not surprisingly, because of lower land costs,
tree planting in the tropics and some activities in the boreal region might be worth
undertaking, as well as some in the US where rates of tree growth are exceptionally
high. The only other exception occurs when trees are harvested and burned in
place of fossil fuels to generate electricity, and then not in all locations. Of course,
if transaction costs were included, the estimated costs could be doubled (Slangen
et al. 2008, pp. 200–205).
Agricultural activities that enhance soil organic carbon and store carbon in
biomass are also considered a means to create offset credits. Agricultural activities
identified by the IPCC (2000) include re-vegetation (establishment of vegetation that
does not meet the definitions of afforestation and reforestation), cropland manage-
ment (greater use of conservation tillage, more set asides) and grazing management
(manipulation of the amount and type of vegetation and livestock produced). These
activities provide temporary offsets only. For example, one study found that all of the
soil organic carbon stored as a result of 20 years of conservation tillage was released
in a single year of conventional tillage (Stockfisch et al. 1999; also Olson et al. 2005).
During the 1990s, farmers increasingly adopted conservation tillage practices,
particularly zero tillage cropping. Farmers who adopt zero tillage balance costs
(lower yields, higher chemical outlays) against benefits (labor and machinery savings
Table 1 Marginal costs of creating carbon offset credits through forestry activities, various forestry
activities and regions, $/tCO2
Activity Region
Global Europe Boreal Tropics
Planting $22–33 $158–185 $5–128 $0–7
Planting & fuel substitution $0–49 $115–187 $1–90 $0–23
Forest management $60–118 $198–274 $46–210 $34–63
Forest management & fuel substitution $48–77 $203–219 $44–108 $0–50
Forest conservation $47–195 n.a. n.a. $26–136
Adapted from van Kooten and Sohngen (2007)
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Table 2 Cost of creating carbon credits via zero tillage agriculture, $ per metric ton of CO2
Region Wheat Other crops
US South $3 to $4 $0.50 to $1
Prairies $105 to >$500 $41 to $57
US corn belt $39 to $51 $23 to $24
Adapted from Manley et al. (2005)
due to reduced field operations, and carbon payments if any). Low output and
chemical input prices during the 1990s meant that the gain to no-till offsets the
financial loss due to lower yields and greater use of chemicals to control weeds.
As prices and technologies change (e.g., due to incentives promoting biofuels), soil
conservation practices could be reversed, thereby releasing carbon stored in soils.
It is also not uniformly true that zero tillage sequesters more carbon than conven-
tional tillage (Baker et al. 2007; Manley et al. 2005), which would lead to extremely
(even infinitely) high costs of creating carbon credits. Some cost estimates based on
meta-analyses of 52 studies of soil carbon flux and 51 studies of cost differences be-
tween conventional and zero tillage are provided in Table 2.3 The estimates omit the
increased emissions related to greater chemical use and, importantly, the transaction
costs associated with measurement and monitoring. With the exception, perhaps, of
the US South, the cost of generating carbon credits by changing agronomic practices
is not competitive with emissions reduction if the latter cost $20/tCO2.
While biological carbon sequestration offers a bridge to the future, the ultimate
focus of efforts to mitigate climate change is on the avoidance of greenhouse
gas emissions associated with the burning of fossil fuels. What are the long-term
consequences of reducing current fossil fuel use? Some argue that, by leaving fossil
fuels in the ground, their eventual use is only delayed and, as with carbon sequestered
in a biological sink, results in the same obligation for the future (Herzog et al. 2003).
The reasoning behind this is that the price path of fossil fuels will be lower in the
future because, by reducing use today, more fossil fuels are available in the future.
However, if society commits to de-carbonizing the economy, behaviour changes and
technology evolves in ways that reduce future demand for fossil fuels, much as wood
used by locomotives was replaced by coal and then by diesel. Carbon in terrestrial
sinks, on the other hand, always has the potential to be released.
In the literature, several proposals exist for addressing the ephemeral nature of
biological sinks, both for purposes of carbon trading and policy evaluation (cost–
benefit analysis). Partial instead of full credits can be provided for storing carbon
based on the perceived risk that carbon will be released from a sink at some future
date. The buyer or seller may be required to take out an insurance policy, where
the insurer will compensate for the losses associated with unexpected carbon release
3We focus on zero tillage because reduced tillage does not lower atmospheric CO2 as the carbon
stored in soils is offset by that released by increased production, transportation and application of
chemicals (West and Marland 2002).
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(Subak 2003). Alternatively, the buyer or seller can assure that the temporary activity
will be followed by one that results in permanent emission reductions.
The ton-years approach specifies that emissions can be compensated for by re-
moving CO2 from the atmosphere and storing it for a period before releasing it back
to the atmosphere. The conversion rate between ton-years of (temporary) carbon
sequestration and permanent tons of emissions reduction is specified in advance
(Dutschke 2002; IPCC 2000). The conversion rate ranges from 42 to 150 ton-years of
temporary storage to cover one permanent ton (and is based on forest rotation ages).
Rather than the authority establishing a conversion factor, market forces might be
relied on to determine the conversion rate between (permanent) emissions reduction
and temporary removals of CO2 from the atmosphere (Marland et al. 2001; Sedjo
and Marland 2003). However, temporary credits are likely to be discounted quite
highly because of greater uncertainty (due to the risk of unanticipated release of
stored carbon), higher transaction costs (related to measurement and monitoring),
and seller-host liability for the sink at the end of the contract period (reducing supply
of sink-related carbon uptake services).
The instrument adopted by the UNFCC for forestry projects under the CDM is
the temporary certified emission reduction unit, denoted tCER. A tCER is purchased
for a set period of time and, upon expiry, has to be covered by substitute credits or
reissued credits if the original project is continued. However, because monitoring and
verification (measurement) are onerous and international bookkeeping is required
to keep track of credits, transaction costs are high and rent seeking through dubious
projects is likely unavoidable.
3 Comparing carbon credit values when duration differs across projects
Consider a comparison between two climate change mitigation options, neither of
which results in permanent removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. Suppose that the
more permanent of the two, say a policy that leads to a lower current rate of CO2
emissions, leads to an increase in CO2 emissions N years from now, as argued by
Herzog et al. (2003); the more ephemeral project generates temporary offset credits
through sequestration of CO2 in a forest ecosystem, but releases the CO2 in n years.
(The comparison could just as well be between two carbon sequestration projects of
different durations.) What then is the value of a forest-sink offset credit relative to
an emissions reduction credit? Suppose that a unit of CO2 not in the atmosphere is
currently worth $q, but that the shadow price rises at an annual rate γ < r, where r is
the discount rate. Then the value of emissions reduction is:
P =
N∑
t=1
(1 + γ )t q
(1 + r)t =
1 + γ
r − γ q
[
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)N]
, (1)
while a sink offset would be worth some proportion α of the emissions reduction, or:
αP =
n∑
t=1
(1 + γ )t q
(1 + r)t =
1 + γ
r − γ q
[
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)n]
. (2)
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Upon taking the ratio of Eq. 2 to Eq. 1 and simplifying, we obtain the value of
‘temporary’ relative to ‘permanent’ storage:
α =
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)n
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)N , (3)
which depends on the discount rate (r), the time it takes a ton of CO2 stored in a
forest ecosystem to return to the atmosphere (n), and the time it takes a ton of CO2
not emitted today to increase emissions at a future date (N). Notice that the value
does not depend on the price of carbon (q). As indicated in Table 3, the proportional
value of a sink credit to an emissions reduction credit (α) varies depending on the
Table 3 Value of a temporary relative to a permanent carbon credit (α), various scenarios
n to N ratio N = 100 years discount rate N= 200 years discount rate N= 500 years discount rate
2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 10%
Growth rate of shadow price of carbon, γ = 0
0.01 0.023 0.048 0.091 0.040 0.093 0.174 0.094 0.216 0.379
0.05 0.109 0.218 0.379 0.183 0.386 0.614 0.390 0.705 0.908
0.10 0.208 0.389 0.615 0.333 0.623 0.851 0.629 0.913 0.991
0.15 0.298 0.523 0.761 0.457 0.769 0.943 0.774 0.974 0.999
0.20 0.379 0.628 0.851 0.558 0.858 0.978 0.862 0.992 1.000
0.25 0.453 0.710 0.908 0.641 0.913 0.991 0.916 0.998 1.000
0.30 0.520 0.775 0.943 0.709 0.947 0.997 0.949 0.999 1.000
Growth rate of shadow price of carbon, γ = 0.01
0.01 0.016 0.039 0.082 0.023 0.075 0.157 0.048 0.177 0.347
0.05 0.077 0.180 0.347 0.109 0.322 0.574 0.220 0.621 0.882
0.10 0.150 0.329 0.574 0.208 0.540 0.819 0.392 0.857 0.986
0.15 0.219 0.451 0.722 0.297 0.688 0.923 0.526 0.946 0.998
0.20 0.285 0.551 0.819 0.378 0.789 0.967 0.631 0.979 1.000
0.25 0.348 0.634 0.882 0.452 0.857 0.986 0.713 0.992 1.000
0.30 0.408 0.703 0.923 0.519 0.903 0.994 0.778 0.997 1.000
Growth rate of shadow price of carbon, γ = 0.02
0.01 n.a. 0.030 0.073 n.a. 0.056 0.140 n.a. 0.135 0.314
0.05 n.a. 0.143 0.315 n.a. 0.252 0.530 n.a. 0.516 0.849
0.10 n.a. 0.266 0.530 n.a. 0.441 0.779 n.a. 0.765 0.977
0.15 n.a. 0.373 0.678 n.a. 0.583 0.896 n.a. 0.886 0.997
0.20 n.a. 0.466 0.780 n.a. 0.688 0.951 n.a. 0.945 0.999
0.25 n.a. 0.546 0.849 n.a. 0.768 0.977 n.a. 0.973 1.000
0.30 n.a. 0.615 0.897 n.a. 0.827 0.989 n.a. 0.987 1.000
Growth rate of shadow price of carbon, γ = 0.04
0.01 n.a. 0.015 0.055 n.a. 0.022 0.106 n.a. 0.047 0.245
0.05 n.a. 0.076 0.245 n.a. 0.107 0.429 n.a. 0.215 0.754
0.10 n.a. 0.148 0.431 n.a. 0.204 0.674 n.a. 0.383 0.939
0.15 n.a. 0.217 0.571 n.a. 0.293 0.814 n.a. 0.516 0.985
0.20 n.a. 0.283 0.677 n.a. 0.373 0.894 n.a. 0.621 0.996
0.25 n.a. 0.345 0.757 n.a. 0.446 0.939 n.a. 0.704 0.999
0.30 n.a. 0.405 0.817 n.a. 0.512 0.965 n.a. 0.768 1.000
n.a. not applicable as calculation cannot be made
Climatic Change (2009) 95:449–463 457
relationship between n and N, the discount rate, and the growth rate (γ ) in damages
from atmospheric concentrations of CO2. It is possible to prove some general results.
Proposition 1 For fixed and finite N > 0, as n/N →0, the value of temporary storage
relative to permanent emissions reduction goes to zero. The more ephemeral a sink
project, the less valuable it is relative to emissions reduction.
Proof This proposition is obvious. Nonetheless, differentiate Eq. 3 with respect to n
and N, and sign the results.
∂α
∂n
= −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)n
ln
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
) > 0· (4)
∂α
∂ N
=
[
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)n](1 + γ
1 + r
)N
ln
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)
[
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)N]2 < 0. (5)
The reason for the signs is that the natural logarithm of a number less than 1 is
negative (recall γ < r). Clearly, as the length of temporary storage decreases relative
to the ‘permanent’ CO2 emission reduction, result (Eq. 4) indicates that the value
of a temporary sink relative to an emission reduction falls (because all other things
are held constant—the ceteris paribus condition); thus, for a given N, as n/N →0,
α→0. Likewise, the value of a temporary sink decreases as the ‘duration’ of an
emission reduction (N) increases, ceteris paribus, because the period of sequestration
(n) becomes too small to have any value. This might well be the case for carbon stored
in soil as a result of zero tillage. unionsq
Proposition 2 For fixed n/N, an increase in N narrows the difference in importance
between an emissions reduction and a carbon sequestration activity, ceteris paribus.
An increase in N ‘lengthens’ n so that, with discounting, the eventual release of stored
carbon (at time n) is valued much less today. If N → ∞ so that an emission reduction
is truly permanent, then the value of temporary storage depends only on the length of
time that carbon is sequestered.
Proof The second term in the denominator of Eq. 3 approaches 0 as N → ∞, so that
the value of a temporary sink credit relative to a permanent one depends only on n
(given γ and r). Since storage is not infinite, temporary offsets will always be less
valuable than permanent emission reductions. unionsq
Proposition 3 The value of storage increases with the discount rate (∂α/∂r > 0), as
illustrated in Table 3. The reason that ephemeral activities are more important relative
to emissions reduction as the discount rate increases is because the inevitable release of
sink CO2 at some future date is weighted much less than the early sequestration.
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Proof Differentiate Eq. 3 with respect to r:
∂α
∂r
=
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)n
n
(1 + r)
(
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)N) −
(
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)n)(1 + γ
1 + r
)N
N
(
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)N)2
(1 + r)
(6)
The sign of ∂α
∂r > 0 as long as
n
N >
(
1+r
1+γ
)n−1
(
1+r
1+γ
)N−1
, which holds for all n, N > 0, n < N and
γ < r. The proof is numerical. Clearly, if n = N, ∂α
∂r = 0. Assume r = 0.04 and
γ = 0.02. Then, if n = 1 and N = 2, we find 1/2 > 0.4951; if n = 50 and N = 100,
1/2 > 0.2747; if n = 250 and N = 500, 1/2 > 0.0077; and so on. unionsq
Proposition 4 As the rate at which the shadow price of carbon (γ ) increases, the
value of temporary storage relative to a ‘permanent’ emissions reduction decreases.
However, landowners might supply more or less carbon sinks when the price of carbon
is rising over time.
Proof Differentiate Eq. 3 with respect to γ :
∂α
∂γ
= −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)n
n
(1 + γ )
(
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)N) +
(
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)n)(1 + γ
1 + r
)N
N
(
1 −
(
1 + γ
1 + r
)N)2
(1 + γ )
(7)
The result ∂α/∂γ < 0 can only be proven numerically. Assume ∂α/∂γ < 0. Then, it is
possible to rearrange Eq. 7 as: nN >
(
1+r
1+γ
)n−1
(
1+r
1+γ
)N−1
, which holds in all cases as indicated
in Proposition 3. Thus, ∂α/∂γ < 0. Now denote by S(α, P, R; Z) the supply of
carbon sink credits, where α is the relative price of ‘temporary’ (short duration)
versus ‘permanent’ (long duration) credits (as before),4 P is the price of a per-
manent credit, R is a vector of carbon input costs, and Z is a vector of char-
acteristics that describes the offset project. ∂S(α, P, R; Z)/∂α > 0 because supply
of sink credits increases as their price increases. Then, dSdγ = ∂S∂α ∂α∂γ + ∂S∂ P ∂ P∂γ + ∂S∂R ∂R∂γ
cannot be signed because, while ∂S/∂α > 0 and ∂α/∂γ < 0, so the first term is
negative, the second term is positive
(
∂S
/
∂ P >0,∂ P
/
∂γ >0
)
, and the third is unknown
(∂S/∂R < 0, ∂R
/
∂γ ≥ 0 or ∂R/∂γ < 0 ). unionsq
Proposition 5 The minimum value of a carbon sink credit relative to an emission
reduction credit equals the ratio of the lifetimes of the ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’
credits, n/N.
Proof Only γ < r is possible because, if γ > r, economic agents would pursue climate
mitigation (by purchasing carbon sink credits) to such an extent that the rate of
4The relative price is included in the supply function to account for duration.
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growth in atmospheric CO2 (the price of carbon credits) falls enough to equalize
γ and r. Consider r→+γ (or γ→ −r). In that case, Eq. 1 becomes P =
N∑
t=1
q = Nq
and Eq. 2 becomes αP =
n∑
t=1
q = nq, so that α = n/N. unionsq
4 Discussion
The foregoing results have important policy implications that relate to the duration
problem. It is clear that sink offset credits cannot generally be traded one-for-one for
emissions reduction credits, even if the latter are not considered permanent; nor can
credits from different sink projects be traded one-for-one without some adjustment
for duration (say using Table 3). The conversion rate will depend on the length
of time that each project keeps CO2 out of the atmosphere, and, crucially, on the
discount rate. For example, if a sequestration project can ensure that carbon remains
sequestered for 10 years, it is worth only 0.11 of an emission reduction that ensures
no future increase in emissions for 200 years if the discount rate (r) is 2% and the
growth rate of damages (γ ) is 1% (Table 3).
When the damages from atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (shadow carbon
prices) rise over time, the value of temporary sequestration will fall relative to
permanent emissions reduction (Proposition 4). However, while the demand for both
temporary and permanent offsets is expected to increase as the price of a permanent
emissions reduction credit rises, the supply of temporary credits from biological
activities might rise or fall as γ increases—it depends on the effect that an increase
in the rate of damages has on the price of permanent offsets, and the costs of inputs
into biological sequestration (in any), and how these in turn relate to the effect of
relative price or duration on supply.
To judge sink projects in the absence of market data requires that a policy analyst
interested in cost–benefit analysis make arbitrary judgments about the discount
rate, the rate of increase in damages, and the conversion rate between different
biological sink projects to account for differing durations. These are over and above
assumptions and uncertainty related to vegetation growth rates, uptake of carbon
in soils, wildfire, disease, pests and so forth, the majority of which are not explicitly
spelled out in most analyses of terrestrial sink projects.
We do not know the rate at which economic damages increase as more anthro-
pogenic emissions of CO2 enter the atmosphere. If the rate of increase in damages
equals or exceeds the discount rate, then CO2 offset credits from sink activities are
only worth n/N of an emissions-reduction credit (proposition 5). This is equivalent to
assuming a zero discount rate for physical carbon.5 But this implies that temporary
offsets from biological sink activities are overvalued because, as N → ∞, the relative
value of a temporary offset credit falls to zero. It is reasonable to assume that N → ∞
if an emissions-reduction policy results in behavioural changes that cause permanent
reductions in CO2 emissions (e.g., car manufacturers stop producing SUVs as people
demand smaller vehicles).
5For a discussion of discounting physical carbon in this context see van Kooten (2004) and Boyland
(2006).
460 Climatic Change (2009) 95:449–463
Given the difficulty of determining not only the discount rate and the growth
rate in damages, but also the uncertainty surrounding n and N, it will simply not
be possible for the authority to determine a conversion factor between activities
leading to carbon credits of differing duration. Perhaps one can rely on the market
to determine conversion rates, but even the market will have difficulty resolving all
uncertainty, and can only do so if the authority sets rules for trading off temporary
and permanent credits. These are necessarily arbitrary and, given high transaction
costs associated with the creation (measurement, monitoring and trading) of bio-
logical offsets, sink credits are likely to sell more cheaply than warranted. Emitters
will substitute cheap sink credits for more expensive emissions reduction credits,
which reduces their incentive to invest in technologies to increase efficiency. As a
consequence, the ‘bridging’ feature of biological sink activities actually serves to
reduce incentives to conduct needed research and development—it increases the
length of the bridging interval required.
Finally, a country that uses carbon sequestration credits to achieve some propor-
tion of its CO2 emissions-reduction target during Kyoto’s first commitment period
has avoided emissions reductions. If it is to remain committed to long-term climate
mitigation, however, the country must increase its emissions-reduction target in the
next commitment period. It must meet that target plus the shortfall from the previous
period—it still needs to reduce the emissions that were covered by forestry activities.
Further, the country is technically liable for ensuring that the stored carbon remains
there, which will be difficult given the non-permanence of forest sinks. For example,
a country that relies on forest sinks for one-third of a 6% reduction in emissions
and commits to a further 7% reduction for the second commitment period must still
reduce emissions in the second commitment period by an incredible 11%. It has only
reduced emissions by 4% in the first period, and must thus reduce emissions by 9%
during its second period commitment. But, as the forest sink releases its carbon to
the atmosphere, the country must also cover that loss, which amounts to a further
2% reduction in emissions. The temporal shifting in the emissions-reduction burden
caused by reliance on carbon sinks therefore results in an onerous obligation for
future generations, one which they may not be willing to accept.
5 Addressing duration and transaction costs: a plausible approach
We now address the two problems of greatest concern: (1) the ephemeral nature
of biological sinks makes it difficult to compare biological activities with emis-
sions reduction, while (2) keeping track of CO2 uptake and release in biological
sinks requires measurement and monitoring, which are imprecise and expensive.
An appropriate way to deal with the first issue—the problem of duration—is to
count removals of CO2 from the atmosphere and emissions reduction on the same
footing. A debit occurs whenever an anthropogenic activity releases CO2 into the
atmosphere, regardless of the source. A credit is earned by removing CO2 from
the atmosphere and storing it in a terrestrial sink. The credit is the mirror image
of an emissions reduction—one removes CO2 from the atmosphere, the other avoids
putting it there to begin with. Thus, if a forest is harvested, any carbon not stored
in products but released to the atmosphere is debited (in the same way as emissions
from fossil fuels). Likewise, any carbon released by decay of wood products, or any
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soil carbon released to the atmosphere, is counted as a debit at the time of release. If
harvested fiber is burned in lieu of fossil fuels, a debit is also incurred but it is offset
by the credit earned when growing biomass removes CO2 from the atmosphere:
However, the carbon sequestered must be appropriately discounted so there is a net
release in discounted CO2.
What about forest conservation or avoidance of deforestation, which accounts for
more than one-quarter of all anthropogenic emissions? In some ways this is similar
to the emissions situation. Credits can only be earned through emissions avoidance
if there is a target level of emissions and emissions are below the target. Without a
target, emissions avoidance is nothing more than avoidance of debits. True credits
can only be earned by removing CO2 from the atmosphere. While it may be possible
to mitigate CO2 emissions by delaying (perhaps indefinitely) deforestation, there can
be no credit for doing so unless there is some target level of deforestation so that,
just as in the case of emissions avoidance, one gets credits by being below the target.
Otherwise, the only benefit results from the avoidance of debits.
With this accounting framework, a country’s debits minus credits, or net debits,
constitute its annual emissions. The country can choose to tax debits and subsidize
credits (e.g., see van Kooten et al. 1995), or cap net debits and then permit trade.
The only real obstacle that remains to be overcome relates to the measurement
and monitoring of carbon uptake and release from a terrestrial sink, which greatly
increase transaction costs.
A straightforward way of reducing transaction costs in this case is to employ
contracts between the authority (government, trading exchange) and a landowner.
The contract specifies the change in land use that the landowner will implement and
an accompanying schedule of carbon flux—annual CO2 uptake for each year the land
use change is in place and release when the land use changes, either to the previous
use or some other. It also specifies the length of time that the land is to be kept in
its new use and the penalties if the contracted-for use changes (including denudation
due to wildfire, etc.), including requirements that the landowner purchase certain
emissions reduction offsets or pay penalties. Transaction costs are minimized because
only the change is land use needs to be monitored and not the CO2 flux or anything
else, although there is the cost of writing a contract. Under these circumstances,
contracts can be traded in carbon markets, although it is likely that few would
undertake to do so based on Tables 1 and 2. Alternatively, through international
negotiations, countries could set different targets for emissions reduction and bio-
logical sink activities, again using contracts with landowners to minimize transaction
costs and facilitating exchange of contracts in a separate market.
6 Conclusions
Our main conclusion is that terrestrial ecosystem activities to generate CO2 offset
credits are a distraction from the actual job of mitigating climate change. While
there is no question that carbon can be stored in biological sinks, and that care
should be taken to foster such sinks and ensure that carbon is not unwontedly and
needlessly released (e.g., via deforestation), the primary focus of climate change
mitigation should be on policies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There are
several reasons for this. Measurement, monitoring and verification of sink activities
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is particularly difficult, resulting in high transaction costs that need to be added to the
price at which temporary credits will trade. Transaction costs are sufficiently large
that most sink projects would no longer be economically viable to pursue based on
estimates in Tables 1 and 2. This is even more so the case if stored carbon must
be accounted for in perpetuity. Second, while it makes some sense to encourage
carbon sinks because they offer a bridge to enable development of technologies
with lower fuel emissions (e.g., more efficient vehicles), permitting below-cost sales
of sink credits in carbon markets will result in reduced incentives to invest in new
technologies.
Rent seeking by opportunistic sellers of carbon credits, and even by environmental
groups, highlights another important problem: terrestrial sinks remove CO2 from
the atmosphere at different rates and store it for varying lengths of time, with both
removal rates and storage times embodying significant uncertainty. This facilitates
the marketing of dubious sink offset credits. While this duration problem can readily
be solved (e.g., taxing emissions and subsidizing removals at the time they occur),
given the high transaction costs of including sink activities and the reluctance of
countries to make sinks work, the only conclusion is that great care must be taken,
and appropriate institutions put in place, before terrestrial ecosystem sink activities
can be included in a carbon trading system.
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